N185DN

the B767 Captain's failure to maintain a safe clearance between his wing and the tail of the CRJ900 that was stopped on a taxiway.

On July 14, 2011, about 1933 eastern daylight time, Delta Air Lines flight 266, a Boeing 767-300ER, N185DN, was taxiing for departure when its left winglet struck the horizontal stabilizer of Atlantic Southeast Airlines flight 4904, a Bombardier CL-600-2D24 (CRJ900), N132EV, which was on taxiway M holding for departure on runway 09 at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts. The CRJ900 sustained substantial damage and the 767 sustained minor damage. There were no injuries to any of the passengers and crew aboard either airplane. Flight 4904, the CRJ900, was stopped behind two other airplanes on the south side of taxiway M awaiting takeoff clearance for runway 9. Flight 266, the B767, was taxiing for departure on runway 4R and was instructed by the ground controller to hold short of runway 4L on taxiway B. After holding short of runway 4L for a few minutes, the ground controller instructed them to "taxi to runway 4R, good rate around the corner." The captain recalled the ground controller had said the landing traffic was four miles out on final approach. The flight crew stated that they looked for the landing traffic and saw a "heavy" airplane approaching the airport with its landing gear extended were not sure if the landing traffic was going to runway 4L, runway 4R or runway 9. The captain indicated he expedited the taxi to cross the runway 4L approach path and estimated a taxi speed of more than 20 knots when they crossed the 4L approach path. After the B767 crossed the runway 4L approach path, ATC said "nice job, monitor tower on 132.22, should get you right outta here at this next arrival." The B767 first officer (FO) stated he then was changing to the tower frequency when he looked up and saw that they were closing the distance to the CRJ900 faster than he had expected and said "watch this guy". The captain stated that after turning on to taxiway B, he noticed the CRJ900 that was stopped on taxiway M and thought that it looked clear of taxiway B. The captain stated that it looked like they would be clear of the CRJ900 but the distance was going to be close so he steered the B767 slightly to the right (about three feet) of the taxiway centerline and applied light braking when the collision occurred. According to the accident captain and a Delta check airman, the B767 wingtips are not visible from the cockpit unless the windows are opened. The CRJ900 sustained substantial damage to the horizontal tail and vertical tail and fluid was lost in all three hydraulic systems.

On July 14, 2011, about 1933 eastern daylight time, Delta Air Lines flight 266, a Boeing 767-300ER, N185DN, was taxiing for departure when its left winglet struck the horizontal stabilizer of Atlantic Southeast Airlines flight 4904, a Bombardier CL-600-2D24 (CRJ900), N132EV, which was on taxiway M holding for departure on runway 09 at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts. The CRJ900 sustained substantial damage and the 767 sustained minor damage. There were no injuries to any of the passengers and crew aboard either airplane. Flight 4904, the CRJ900, was stopped behind two other airplanes on the south side of taxiway M awaiting takeoff clearance for runway 9. Flight 266, the B767, was taxiing for departure on runway 4R and was instructed by the ground controller to hold short of runway 4L on taxiway B. After holding short of runway 4L for a few minutes, the ground controller instructed them to "taxi to runway 4R, good rate around the corner." The captain recalled the ground controller had said the landing traffic was four miles out on final approach. The flight crew stated that they looked for the landing traffic and saw a "heavy" airplane approaching the airport with its landing gear extended were not sure if the landing traffic was going to runway 4L, runway 4R or runway 9. The captain indicated he expedited the taxi to cross the runway 4L approach path and estimated a taxi speed of more than 20 knots when they crossed the 4L approach path. After the B767 crossed the runway 4L approach path, ATC said "nice job, monitor tower on 132.22, should get you right outta here at this next arrival." The B767 first officer (FO) stated he then was changing to the tower frequency when he looked up and saw that they were closing the distance to the CRJ900 faster than he had expected and said "watch this guy". The captain stated that after turning on to taxiway B, he noticed the CRJ900 that was stopped on taxiway M and thought that it looked clear of taxiway B. The captain stated that it looked like they would be clear of the CRJ900 but the distance was going to be close so he steered the B767 slightly to the right (about three feet) of the taxiway centerline and applied light braking when the collision occurred. According to the accident captain and a Delta check airman, the B767 wingtips are not visible from the cockpit unless the windows are opened. The CRJ900 sustained substantial damage to the horizontal tail and vertical tail and fluid was lost in all three hydraulic systems.

The flight crew’s failure to identify the correct landing surface due to fatigue. Contributing to the cause of the incident were (1) the flight crew’s decision to accept a late runway change, (2) the unavailability of the approach light system and the instrument landing system for the runway of intended landing, and (3) the combination of numerous taxiway signs and intermixing of light technologies on the taxiway.

During the flight one of the three required flight deck crew members became ill and was considered to be incapacitated. The remaining two crew members conducted the entire night flight without the benefit of a customary break period. Throughout the flight the crew made comments indicating that they were fatigued and identified fatigue as their highest threat for the approach, but did not discuss strategies to mitigate the consequences of fatigue. At the time of the incident, the crew had been on duty for about 12 hours and the captain had been awake for over 22 hours, while the first officer had been awake for at least 14 hours. During the descent and approach, the flight crew was assigned a number of runway changes; the last of which occurred near the final approach fix for runway 27L. While the flight was on final approach, the crew was offered and accepted a clearance to sidestep to runway 27R for landing. Although the flight crew had previously conducted an approach briefing for two different runways, they had not briefed the approach for runway 27R and were not aware that the approach light system and the instrument landing system (ILS) were not available to aid in identifying that runway. When the crew accepted the sidestep to runway 27R, the captain, who was the flying pilot, saw the precision approach path indicator and lined the airplane up on what he said were the brightest set of lights he could see. During the final approach, the first officer was preoccupied with attempting to tune and identify the ILS frequency for runway 27R. Just prior to the airplane touching down, the captain realized they were landing on a taxiway. The airplane landed on taxiway M, 200 feet north of, and parallel to, runway 27R. Postincident flight evaluations of the airport lighting indicated that there were a number of visual cues that could have misguided the captain to align with taxiway M instead of runway 27R while on final approach. These cues included numerous taxiways signs along the sides of taxiway M which, from the air, appeared to be white and could be perceived as runway edge lights. In addition, the blue light emitting diode (LED) lights used on the eastern end of taxiway M were perceived to be brighter than the adjacent incandescent lights on the airfield and the alternating yellow and green lights in the ILS critical area provided the appearance of a runway centerline. The postincident flight evaluations indicated that when the approach lights or the ILS for runway 27R were available and used, it was clearlyevident when the airplane was not aligned with the runway.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On Monday Oct. 19, 2009, at 0605 EDT (all times in this report will be Eastern Daylight Time unless otherwise noted), a Boeing B767-332ER, N185DN, operating as Delta Air Lines flight 60 from Rio de Janeiro – Galeão – Antonio Carlos Jobim International Airport (SBGL was the International Civil Aviation Organization airport code, and GIG was the three letter International Air Transport Association airport code) to Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport (ATL) landed on taxiway "M" at ATL after being cleared to land on runway 27R. No injuries were reported. The flight deck crew included a check airman, a captain receiving special airport qualification operating experience from the check airman, and one first officer. During cruise flight, the check airman became ill and was located in the cabin for the remainder of the flight; including the approach and landing. Prior to the flight, on Sunday, October 18, 2009, the flight crew arrived at SBGL to prepare for their flight to ATL. During the preflight activities, the check airman became ill with a gastrointestinal disorder. After a brief time away from the flight deck, the check airman returned to the flight deck and advised the other crew members he was “fine” and continued with the flight preparations. The flight departed the gate at about 2240 BRST (Brasilia Summer Time) (2040 EDT) with the captain in the left pilot seat, the check airman, who was the captain of record, in the right pilot seat, and the first officer in the observer’s seat. The check airman stated that there were some slight ground delays due to the departure in use that added about 30 minutes to the scheduled flight time. According to interviews with the crew, it was customary for the relief pilot to calculate rest breaks by subtracting time to climb and descend from the total flight time, and dividing the remainder by the number of crew members to determine the length of each break. After reaching the top of climb, the crew calculated the rest breaks for the flight and determined that the check airman would take the first break of about 2 hours and 50 minutes. The check airman proceeded to the cabin for his rest break. At the completion of his rest break, it was determined that the check airman was ill and the crew enlisted the aid of a physician on board the flight. The flight crew notified the company dispatcher (dispatch is also referred to as “flight control” in company literature) via satellite communications regarding the check airman’s illness and the captain listed himself as the captain of record. The flight crew elected to continue the flight to ATL for landing and according to flight crew statements; they requested that dispatch arrange for emergency services to meet the airplane when they arrived. According to the dispatcher statement, he received the satellite call on October 19 about 0400 and then notified emergency medical personnel at ATL. Prior to the top of descent point, the crew prepared for,and briefed for a landing on runway 27L at ATL. Upon check in with Atlanta Approach Control, the controller assigned runway 26R for landing. The crew briefed for an approach to 26R. The crew was subsequently re-assigned to runway 27L and at about the outer marker for that runway approach, the ATL tower local controller offered runway 27R, which the crew accepted. The local controller then cleared the flight to land on runway 27R. The captain stated in an interview that the flight was lined up on approach to runway 27L and when the flight was cleared to land on 27R he maneuvered for the side step and lined up on “the next brightest set of lights” he saw. He stated that he saw “bright edge lights and centerline lights” and thought he had the runway in sight. The flight crew landed on taxiway M, which was a parallel taxiway located about 200 feet to the north of runway 27R. PERSONNEL INFORMATION THE CAPTAIN The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multi engine land rating and type ratings in Boeing 727, 737, 757, 767, McDonnell Douglas MD-11, and Lear Jet airplanes. The captain was hired by Delta Air Lines in 1990 and according to company records, accumulated about 9,122 hours of total flight time, which included about 3,131 hours in the Boeing 767. The captain held a first class medical certificate which was issued on August 21, 2009. THE CAPTAIN’S 72-HOUR HISTORY The captain was off duty from October 3-15, 2009. When not working, the captain stated that he needed about 8 hours of sleep to feel well rested. He said he was naturally an evening person but events in life pushed him towards being a morning person. On Friday, October 16, 2009, the captain awoke about 0630-0700, ate breakfast, walked the dog, and went for a run. That afternoon he took a nap for about an hour. He drove to the ATL airport early so he would have time to update his charts and meet with the check airman prior to the flight to SBGL. He felt rested before the flight and said the flight to Rio was normal. The flight arrived in Rio on Saturday, October 17 at about 0900 BRT (0800 EDT). (BRT is Brasilia Time; the clocks in the Rio de Janeiro time zone were set forward one hour to BRST at midnight between Saturday October 17 and Sunday October 18 in observance of daylight savings time.) The captain said the layover was normal. He napped for about 3-4 hours before meeting some of the crew for dinner. He returned to the hotel about 2330-0000 BRT (2230-2300 EDT). On Sunday, October 18, the captain awoke about 0930-1000 BRST (0730-0800 EDT). He stayed around the hotel room, sent emails, exercised, and then tried unsuccessfully to take a nap. He said he just could not fall asleep. He had not been hungry during the day so he did not eat. He went down to the hotel lobby for pick up early and had a cappuccino. He went to the airport with the crew and said he felt “fine”. Although he had been up for about 11 hours, he said it was not an unusually long timebut he was looking forward to his 3 hour break on the airplane because he normally could get a good amount of rest during that time. The FIRST OFFICER The first officer held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multi engine land rating and type ratings in Boeing 757, 767, McDonnell Douglas DC-9, and Beechcraft BE-1900 airplanes. The first officer was hired by Delta Air Lines in 2000 and according to company records, accumulated about 4,000 hours of total flight time, which included about 1,591 hours in the Boeing 767. The first officer held a first class medical certificate which was issued on April 13, 2009. THE FIRST OFFICER’S 72-HOUR HISTORY Prior to the incident trip pairing, the first officer was off duty for “a couple of days”. She stated that, when not working, she typically needed 6-8 hours of sleep to feel rested, and more sleep when she exercised. On Friday, October 16, 2009, the first officer awoke about 0700. She was not scheduled to fly so she went on the computer to try to pick up some flying. The incident trip pairing showed up on the swap board and she picked it up. She packed and organized to leave on the trip that night. She tried to nap but that “did not work so well” because she usually did not nap well and she got a good night’s sleep the previous night. She signed in for the trip at 2005 and the flight pushed back from the gate in ATL about 2200. During the flight from ATL to SBGL she ate part of the crew meal but did not believe she had breakfast. The flight arrived in Rio on Saturday, October 17 at about 0900 BRT (0800 EDT), and she took the bus to the hotel. The flight crew and flight attendants met at the hotel and went down to the beach. She took a nap for about 3 hours and “felt okay” when she awoke. She did not set an alarm and woke up when she woke up. That evening, the flight crew and flight attendants met at the bar around 1800 BRT (1700 EDT) and then dinner about 2000 BRT (1900 EDT). After dinner, the captains and she went back to the hotel. She went to bed about 0130-0200 BRST (2330-0000 EDT). On Sunday, October 18, she awoke about 0700 BRST (0500 EDT). During the day she studied for recurrent training and went to a market. She napped for about 3-4 hours which she said was “really good” for her. She said she felt good from her nap and felt rested. She then got ready for their pick up and ate a sandwich within the two hours before pick up. She left the hotel about 1950 BRST (1750 EDT), which was the start of the crew’s duty time. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured in 1995 and was maintained under a continuous airworthiness inspection program. As of its last inspection in February of 2009, it had accumulated 70,009 total hours of operation on the airframe. METEORLOGICAL INFORMATION The weather reported at 0552 EDT for ATL included calm winds, clear sky with visibility of 10 statute miles, and temperature of 3 degrees Celsius. A review of the U.S. Naval Observatory Sun and Moondata for Atlanta, Georgia, at the time of the incident indicated a “waxing crescent with 3% of the Moon's visible disk illuminated.” Moonset occurred at 1901 EDT on the preceding day and moonrise was to occur at 0918 on the day of the incident. Civil twilight was to begin at 0721 on the day of the incident. AERODROME INFORMATION ATL was owned by the City of Atlanta and operated by the Department of Aviation. The airport was located about ten miles from downtown Atlanta at 33° 28’ 21.1” north and 84° 25’ 39.6” west, and was certificated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139. ATL had five runways for flight operations. All runways were positioned in about an east west direction. Runways 8R/26L and 8L/26R were located to the north of the airport terminal ramp complex. Runways 9L/27R and 9R/27L were located immediately to the south of the terminal ramp complex and runway 10/28 was located to the south of runways 9R/27L and south of the cargo ramp. Runway 27R was an 11,890 foot-long, 150 foot-wide grooved concrete runway equipped with high intensity runway edge lights, and centerline lights. Runway 27R was equipped with a precision approach path indicator located on the right side of the runway. Taxiway M was a 75 foot-wide concrete taxiway parallel and to the north (right) side of runway 27R. The taxiway was equipped with edge lights, colored blue, and centerline lights colored green. LIGHTING SYSTEM Runway 27R edge and centerline lights operated on a 5-step system. The edge lights at the east and west ends of taxiway M operated on a 3-step system and the edge lights in the middle section of taxiway M, as well as the taxiway M centerline lights, operated on a 5-step system. Guidance in Federal Aviation Administration order JO 7110.65S, “Air Traffic Control”, indicated that runway edge and centerline lights operating on a 5 step system would be set to step 1 at night when the visibility was greater than 5 miles. The guidance also indicated that taxiway edge and centerline lights operating on a 3 step system would be set to step 1 and those operating on a 5 step system would be set to step 3 when the visibility was 1 mile or more, or set to step 1 or 2 when requested by pilots. Advisory Circular 150/5345-56, (Specification For L-890 Airport Lighting Control And Monitoring System (ALCMS)”, recommended that lighting presets for both 3 step and 5 step systems be set to step 1 at night when the visibility was greater than 5 miles. At the time of the incident, runway 27R edge lights and centerline lights were set on step 1 of 5 with a corresponding amperage output of 2.8 amps. At the time of the incident, the edge lights on the east end of taxiway M were set on step 3 of 3 with a 6.6 amperage output. The taxiway M edge lights west of taxiway J to taxiway T were set on step 5 of 5, and the edge lights on the west end of taxiway M were set on step 3 of 3 each, corresponding to a 6.6 amperage output. The taxiway M centerline lights for the entirelength of the taxiway were set on step 2 of 5 which resulted in a 3.4 amperage output. During a 2009 construction project to extend taxiways M and L, the edge lights and centerline lights on the east end of taxiway M were replaced with new in-pavement LED (light emitting diode) type lights. The resulting configuration included blue LED lights on the edges of taxiway M from the east end to taxiway J, and incandescent lighting on the edges of taxiway M west of taxiway J. The most eastern approximately 1,700 feet of the taxiway was equipped with alternating green and amber centerline lights identifying the instrument landing system (ILS) critical area. The taxiway M centerline lights from the west end of the ILS critical area up to approximately taxiway J were green LED lights and those west of taxiway J consisted of in pavement incandescent lights. Interviews with personnel from FAA’s Airport Engineering Group indicated that they had received some pilot comments regarding the brightness of LED lights during testing of the new LED lighting conducted at Atlantic City Airport in Atlantic City, New Jersey, but no formal pilot input was collected as part of the testing. The interviews with FAA Airport Engineering also indicated that although incandescent and LED lights of the same color and intensity will test in the same color and brightness range, the LED type lights were perceived by the human eye to be brighter than incandescent lights when in clear visibility. The FAA Technical Center Visual Guidance Program Manager stated in an interview that research conducted by FAA, in conjunction with International Civil Aviation Organization, determined that pilots “do not like” the intermixing of LED and incandescent lights on a movement surface. FAA personnel confirmed that there was no published standard for intermixing LED and incandescent lighting over one continuous movement surface. However; interviews with FAA personnel indicated that the International Civil Aviation Organization Visual Aids Working Group had formed a subcommittee to conduct research on the use of LED type lights for airport applications. As a result of the subcommittee’s study, the Visual Aids Working Group proposed a recommendation to the International Civil Aviation Organization to limit intermixing of LED and incandescent lights. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATL was a level 12 Air Traffic Control (ATC) tower responsible for ATC services for aircraft arriving and departing ATL and for aircraft transiting ATL airspace 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. DAL 60 (Delta Air Lines flight 60) checked in on frequency with the ATL approach controller approach controller at approximately 0554 at which time the approach controller advised DAL 60 to expect a landing on runway 26R. At approximately 0556, the approach controller advised DAL 60 to proceed direct to ANVAL, an intersection depicted on the published approach for ILS 27L. After the flight crew queried the approach controller regarding theexpected runway, the ap

the improper installation of the generator feed cable by the manufacturer, which resulted in a severed aileron cable due to arcing between the generator feed cable and aileron cable.

Shortly after departure, the flightcrew heard a loud pop or crack, and the airplane made an uncommanded roll to the left. In addition, the right generator off light illuminated. By holding continuous input to the control yoke, the airplane was returned to a wings-level attitude, and returned for an overweight landing without incident. Examination of the airplane revealed that one of two aileron cables on the right side aileron control had been severed by electrical arcing from the right engine generator feed line. No evidence of contact between the generator feed cable and the aileron cable was found. However, a pin hole about 1/8 inch in diameter was found on the plastic sheath of the generator feed cable in the area where the aileron cable passed nearby. The Boeing drawing used for production states to maintain a 1.0 inch minimum clearance between the aileron cable and the generator feed line. When the aileron cable was replaced and tensioned on the incident airplane, the clearance between the aileron cable and generator feed line was measured at 3/16 inch.

On June 25, 1996, about 1857 eastern daylight time, Delta Airlines Flight 148, N185DN, a Boeing 767-332ER, experienced flight control problems shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. There were no injuries to the 229 occupants. The aircraft received minor damage. The destination was Rome, Italy. The flight was operated under 14 CFR Part 121, and had departed from JFK at 1852. In the NTSB Incident Report, Delta Airlines stated: "...The flight departed JFK for FCO and was on radar vectors when a loud "crack" or "pop" was heard in the cockpit. The First Officer was the flying pilot. Approximately one to two seconds after the loud noise was heard, the "right generator off" light illuminated. An uncommanded roll to the left was observed by the First Officer, who countered with right aileron inputs. Control forces required to maintain wings level were high, however the aircraft was controllable at all times. The flight crew disconnected the autopilot and completed the checklist procedure for the generator malfunction. The flight returned to JFK for an overweight landing. The aircraft was landed by the Captain on runway 31L without further incident....." The left side, right aileron cable P/N A2B-3 was severed at approximately station 340, Water Line 190, Right Buttock Line 67.5. This is just forward of the forward baggage compartment on the right side, in the electrical equipment bay. In the same area, the right generator power feeder bundle W208 passed. The bundle is made up of three generator power feed cables tied together, with each cable protected by a plastic sheath. When the aileron cable was replaced and tensioned, the clearance between the aileron cable and the generator feed cable was measured at 3/16 inch. Evidence of arcing was observed on the severed halves of the cable. A small hole was found on the fed line at the location next to where the cable separation occurred. No evidence of direct contact between the aileron cable and the plastic sheath over the generator feed cable was found. A small hole, about 1/8 inch in diameter was found on the plastic sheath over the generator feed cable in the area where aileron cable passed next to the generator feed cable. The Boeing drawing used for production states, "Maintain a minimum clearance of 1.0 inch between bundle [generator feed line] and control cable." The airplane was delivered in 1991, and had accumulated 5,975.2 hours at the time of the incident.