N382DN

The first officer’s excessive aft sidestick input following a bounced landing, and the line check pilot’s delayed remedial action, which resulted in an increase in the airplane’s pitch attitude and a subsequent tailstrike.

Delta Air Lines flight 1181 experienced a tailstrike while attempting to land on runway 22 at Laguardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. The airplane sustained substantial damage and there were no injuries to the 6 crew and 188 passengers onboard. The captain, who was serving as the line check pilot (LCP), was providing operational experience (OE) training to the first officer (FO). The accident flight was their fourth leg together and the FO’s third as the pilot flying. According to the flight crew, the captain instructed the FO to hand-fly the arrival. The autopilot was disconnected at approximately 18,000 ft, and the autothrottles were disconnected at about 10,000 ft. The captain reported that the FO flew the arrival well, with no notable altitude or airspeed deviations until the final approach. During short final, the airplane's airspeed began to decrease below the target approach speed. The FO made a thrust adjustment; however, it was insufficient to arrest the airspeed decay. After the captain called out the airspeed deviation, the FO made an additional thrust correction. The flare was initiated slightly late, resulting in a firm touchdown and subsequent bounce. Following the bounce, the FO applied excessive aft sidestick input, and the airplane touched down a second time. The captain then assumed control of the airplane, lowered the nose, and initiated a go-around. After the go-around was established, the FO resumed control and completed a subsequent approach and landing without further incident. The flight attendants notified the flight deck that they heard a loud scraping noise during the landing attempt. Postlanding inspection of the airplane by the flight crew revealed substantial damage to the lower fuselage consistent with its contact with the runway. There was no reported mechanical malfunction that contributed to the excessive airplane pitch angle when the airplane touched down on the runway. The recorded flight data showed the airplane touched down at pitch angle of about 7° and a vertical acceleration of 1.91 gravitational force equivalent (g) and bounced. The airplane’s pitch angle increased to 10.02° before the left sidestick inputs associated with the go-around were recorded. The airplane’s longitudinal flight guidance mode changed to “Pitch GA” (pitch go-around) and the autothrust was engaged. The operator’s flight crew procedures for a bounced landing recovery include the instructions “hold or re-establish a normal landing attitude and add thrust as necessary to control the rate of descent. Thrust need not be added for a shallow bounce or skip. When a high hard bounce occurs initiate a go-around. Apply TOGA thrust and use normal go-around procedures. Do not allow the pitch attitude to increase…” Had the FO recognized the hard-bounce condition, promptly initiated a go-around, and not allowed the pitchto increase in accordance with company procedures, or had the LCP intervened sooner and assumed control to execute the bounced-landing recovery, the excessive pitch attitude and subsequent tailstrike likely would have been avoided.