N902XJ

On October 1, 2025, about 2156 eastern daylight time (EDT), Endeavor Air dba Delta Connection flight 5155, a Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ CL-600-2D24 (CRJ-900), N902XJ, collided with Endeavor Air dba Delta Connection flight 5047, a MHI RJ CL-600-2D24 (CRJ-900), N480PX, at the intersection of taxiways M and A at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York. There were 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 28 passengers on board flight 5155; 1 flight attendant sustained minor injuries. There were no injuries to the 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 57 passengers on board flight 5047. The crew and passengers of both airplanes were deplaned via the main cabin stairs and bussed to the terminal. Flight 5155 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from LGA to Roanoke-Blacksburg Regional Airport (ROA), Roanoke, Virginia. Flight 5047 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina. Flight 5047 landed at LGA and was taxiing to the terminal on taxiway B. Flight 5155 had pushed back from the gate at LGA and was taxiing on taxiway A. Flight 5047 exited taxiway B and had turned onto taxiway M when it was struck by the right wing of flight 5155 at the intersection of taxiways M and A. In response to the accident, the NTSB launched a go-team to LGA. As part of the investigation, the NTSB also invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. Parties named to the investigation included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Endeavor Air, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB Canada), representing the State of Design and State of Manufacture for the airplanes, assigned an Accredited Representative. MHI was named as a technical advisor by the Canadian Accredited Representative. The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Operations, Human Performance, Air Traffic Control (ATC), and Structures. Additionally, NTSB specialists in the areas of Survival Factors, Airport Operations, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were assigned. History of Flight The following timeline (table 1) was constructed from certified ATC audio recordings and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data provided by the FAA. All times are in EDT. Graphical depictions of the movements of flights 5047 and 5155 leading up to the collision are shown in figure 1. Flight 5047 landed on runway 4 and exited the runway on taxiway G. The LGA ground controller instructed flight 5047 to taxi on taxiway B to taxiway M and on to lane 12 in the gate area, which would require flight 5047 to cross taxiway A from M. The crew of flight 5047 subsequently readback the ground controller’s instructions. The crew of flight 5155 contacted the ground controller and stated they were in lane 17 of the gate area. The ground controller subsequently instructed flight 5155 to runway 13 via taxiways A to E, to hold short of runway 4, and to “give way” to another Endeavor Air airplane at taxiway M. The crew of flight 5155 read back the ground controller’s instructions. At this time flight 5047 was on taxiway B at the intersection with taxiway L, and moving towards taxiway M. Subsequently, the ground controller provided the crew of flight 5155 a new departure frequency, which the crew of flight 5155 confirmed, while they were still located in the gate area. Airport surveillance camera videos that captured the collision showed flight 5047 had turned onto taxiway M moving south, and flight 5155 moving east on taxiway A. Flight 5047 abruptly stopped as it approached the intersection with taxiway A, and about 2 seconds later the right wing of flight 5155 collided with the nose of flight 5047. Flight 5047 appeared to turn to the left about 1 second prior to the collision. Table 1. Key transmissions between the LGA ground controller, the crew of flight 5047, and the crew of flight 5155. Time (EDT) Event 2153:54 Flight 5047 exited runway 4 onto taxiway G. 2154:19 Flight 5047 contacted ground controller. 2154:23 Ground controller instructed flight 5047 to taxi on taxiway B to taxiway M and to lane 12. 2154:26 Crew of flight 5047 read back the ground controller’s instructions. 2155:32 Crew of flight 5155 contacted ground controller and stated they were in lane 17. 2155:37 Ground controller instructed flight 5155 to runway 13 via taxiways A to E, to hold short of runway 4, and to “give way” to another Endeavor Air airplane at taxiway M. 2155:41 Crew of flight 5155 read back the ground controller’s instructions. 2155:48 Ground controller provides new departure frequency to flight 5155. 2155:54 Crew of flight 5155 affirms new departure frequency. 2156:40 Collision between flight 5047 and flight 5155. 2157:02 Crew of flight 5047 requested emergency vehicles to taxiway M. Figure 1. Locations of flight 5047 and flight 5155 leading up to and including the collision. All times shown in the labels are in EDT. The CVR and FDR from both airplanes were recovered and sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC for analysis. All four recorders were successfully downloaded and captured the accident. Postaccident examination of N480PX (flight 5047) found substantial damage to the nose and the captain’s windshield (see figure 2). Postaccident examination of N902XJ (flight 5155) found substantial damage to the outboard section of the right wing, including separation of the outboard slat, aileron, and wing tip (see figure 3). Figure 2. Damage to the nose of N480PX. Figure 3. Damage to the right wing of N902XJ. The meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) from LGA, issued on October 1, 2025, at 2151 EDT, showed clear skiesand visibility of 10 statute miles. Postaccident interviews of the flight crew of flight 5047 revealed that the arrival into LGA was uneventful. The captain of flight 5047 estimated their taxi speed on taxiway B was about 9 knots. The flight crew recalled nothing unusual about the taxi instructions from the LGA ground controller. The captain slowed the airplane to turn onto taxiway M. The first officer leaned forward to clear the right side of the airplane at that time. As they made the turn onto taxiway M, the captain was focused on clearing lane 12 but saw another airplane to his left and brought the airplane to a stop. A few seconds later the right wing of flight 5155 impacted the nose and windshield of flight 5047, causing substantial damage to both airplanes. Postaccident interviews of the flight crew of flight 5155 revealed that, after pushback from the gate at LGA, both engines were turned on for taxi. The first officer of flight 5155 recalled hearing the full taxi clearance and recalled it was not confusing. The captain of flight 5155 recalled hearing the taxi clearance up to holding short of runway 4 and did not recall hearing the instruction to give way to another Endeavor Air airplane. The captain stated he was focused on calculating performance numbers for the landing at ROA. Flight 5155 started its taxi, and while taxiing on taxiway A, the flight crew accomplished the taxi checklist, with the first officer calling out the checklist step and the captain verifying the step. The captain recalled he was looking down into the cockpit to visually verify the airplane trim setting as part of the checklist, and when he looked up he saw flight 5047 to the right. The captain of flight 5155 stated he attempted to veer left to avoid the other aircraft, and the captain of flight 5047 stated that he applied brakes immediately before the collision. The investigation continues.